One of the biggest problems everyone seeking investment capital faces is the perception of risk by the would-be lender or investor. What if you could offer to a lender or investor a complete elimination of all risk? What if you could show him a way by which his capital could stay in his own account at all times, remain in his full control, never be exposed to any risk whatsoever, while at the same time expanding and multiplying and funding your project as well?
This is all possible by utilizing the Private Placement Platforms (PPP). Let’s say you want to raise $100 million for a humanitarian project that will benefit the world, and you personally have every right to derive a healthy percentage of that for your own benefit for constructing and administering the project. Let’s further imagine that you can introduce an investor to one of our recommended PPPs who has $100 million to commit to it.
100% of the time, our platforms provide arrangements to the investor whereby his capital stays totally in his own control and is never transferred to anyone else. In most cases, we place no lien, encumbrance, or block on the funds. In a few cases, higher returns are available if the client consents to a block, but those returns are so high and come so soon that the equivalent of 100% of the client’s liquid capital is returned quickly enough, like within one month, that the net benefit makes the block irrelevant and entirely agreeable. In any case, block or no block, the client can see clearly in advance that there is truly zero risk – – that it is out of the question that his capital will ever be placed at risk or out of his control at any time. This gives peace of mind and everyone can sleep at night.
If the returns on the platform are 100% per month, for example, the introducer can request that a percentage of that be paid to his humanitarian project. That percentage is totally up to him to negotiate. Such percentages range anywhere from 1% to 100%, and typically often fall within the range of 30% to 60% or 70%. It all depends upon the capital available, the temperaments of the people involved, the desire (or lack of it) of the investor to support the project, and whether the investor has access to such performing platforms anywhere else without the introducer’s introduction.
So for illustration, let’s imagine that they agree the investor will pay 33% of the returns to the introducer. If the investor puts in $100M and is receiving $100M per month, that means the introducer will be receiving 33% per month. Hence the introducer will receive $99M within three months, and by the fourth month, will have $132M – – well over his goal of $100M.
This is a win-win-win situation – – because for the introducer who has the humanitarian project, the money is a pure grant. It is not a loan and is not an investment that needs to be paid back, unless the investor absolutely insists on having such strings attached as a condition to the agreement. The investor need not be so greedy and demanding, because he wins too – – he is receiving 67% per month with zero risk – – plus the satisfaction of knowing that a great humanitarian project is being funded. No one loses in this arrangement; everyone wins.
However, there is an industry-wide policy in the bank instruments investments world of forbidding side agreements. This is for several reasons. One, if an intermediary is receiving commissions from the program for having introduced the investor, and if that same intermediary also has an agreement to receive a percentage from the investor, that is called “double dipping”. It is frowned upon to get paid by both sides not only in PPPs, but also in most financial markets worldwide.
That same intermediary could make it work one two conditions. One, he can elect to dispense with being a commissionable intermediary altogether. Instead, he would just be called an introducer, and would not be commissionable. And two, if his side agreement is for a set dollar amount instead of a percentage, then it is possible to be approved by the traders. The reason for this is that if it is a percentage, then that introducer is, in effect, in a derivative relationship with the trading team without their having any KYC (Know Your Customer) on him.
It is a derivative relationship because his profit sharing is resulting from a private agreement with the investor, on the one hand; and the investor has a private agreement with the trading team, on the other. Thus, the fulfillment of the profit sharing with the introducer is dependent upon the performance of the trading team to the investor. While such performance is never a problem, in reality, in legitimate platforms that have a recent track record of proven success, it is nevertheless a legal complication for them.
This is because they are indirectly being held responsible for the fulfillment of a contract to which they are not a party, and on which they have no KYC. What if the so-called “humanitarian project” is actually funding violent terrorists in the Middle East or drug runners in Mexico? Without KYC, the platform compliance officers have no idea where that money is going. Further, if the investor fails to fulfill the introducer’s profit-sharing contract, that introducer could potentially try to hold the traders responsible. They might demand proof of payments to the investor or complain to them that their client is in breach of contract. This is none of the trader’s business or concern. Hence the attorneys for the traders and compliance officers do not approve such agreements. If an investor applies to be a platform client and the compliance team discovers that there is a side agreement, they will cancel the application and not approve the client. No invitation to participate will be issued.
A set dollar amount, on the other hand, is more permissible. While the fulfillment of that is also potentially dependent upon the performance of the trading, and the investor’s private contract with the introducer could specify that his fulfillment of the payment of such profit sharing would be contingent upon successful and timely receipt of the proceeds of the platform, the contract could and should also state that the introducer will not be given the names or contact information of the traders or their compliance team . . . and that no evidence or proof of performance or nonperformance of the platform program will ever be provided to the introducer. This is because the investor-client is under a nondisclosure agreement with the trading team, and is thus forbidden to share the inside details of the identities of the traders or the results of the program with any outside party. Breach of that agreement would result in the confiscation of all profit proceeds and being blacklisted against ever being invited again into the platform programs anywhere in the world.
For obvious reasons, this is not a very good deal for the introducer. To take this approach, the introducer would simply have to trust the investor and take his word for it that he will fulfill his agreement. If the investor doesn’t fulfill it, the introducer really has no recourse against him. No court would uphold a civil suit against the investor in such a case, because of the privacy and nondisclosure that the investor must maintain.
The only exception to this would be if the agreement that the introducer has with the investor specifies that the set dollar amount thus agreed upon must be paid from any income or assets that the investor may have, from any source, by a certain date, regardless of the performance or nonperformance of the trading platform. But how many investors would be willing to sign such an agreement?
A better approach would be for both parties to create a House of Freedom International Natural Law Trust together, from Brilliance in Commerce. Let’s say the introducer wants 33% of the proceeds of the platform for his humanitarian project, and the investor is willing to agree to that. But since side agreements of that nature are not permitted by the platforms, this problem would be solved by the introducer and the investor becoming co-trustees of the Natural Law Trust (NLT) together, and registering the trust as the investing client rather than an individual name. Both trustees could be signatories on the trust bank account.
So being, the trading platform only sees one entity – – the trust. It sees who the authorized signatory is – – or signatories are; but the trading platform is not concerned how those signatories split the proceeds that are paid to the trust. It is well known in all financial circles that organizations such as trusts, foundations, and corporations divide and disburse their income and assets to various parties for various purposes, both internally and externally. It is very common and universally well accepted. The trading paymaster and compliance officers have no objection to this, as long as they have good KYC on the signatories and they are not blacklisted anywhere.
The NLT is private. It is not created by attorneys; it is not statutory; it is not registered with any government; and is not posted on public record. Its documents are private, and the trust is sovereign. It does not derive its authority to exist from any statutory body. Its records are private, and it enjoys an exception to filing and disclosing requirements to any authority. Therefore, other than the KYC it must disclose to the platform compliance team for the approval and clearance of the trustees involved, it can keep any internal distribution agreements private. And, the platform compliance team always keeps all such KYC information and documents strictly private and under nondisclosure.
Thus the only things the compliance team will need to know are:
• The names and KYC information of the trustees who are the authorized signatories;
• The history of the capital so they can see it is of clean, clear, and non-criminal origin; and
• If the capital is large, such as $1B or more, they might ask what causes the trust intends to support.
Other than that, they would have no concern about how the trust distributes the funds internally. Within the trust, the introducer’s 33% could be authorized by 33 Units of Beneficial Interest; and the investor’s 67% could be authorized by 67 Units of Beneficial Interest. This would make both of them beneficiaries, which is permitted for trustees in an NLT if they also designate at least one other beneficiary who is not a trustee. To make the trust legitimate, they would have to give at least 1 Unit of Beneficial Interest to at least one additional beneficiary. However, distributions of monies to that beneficiary need not necessarily be made at any particular time.
The way this could work is that 32.5 Units could be given to the Introducer Beneficiary, 66.5 Units could be given to the Investor Beneficiary, and the remaining 1 Unit could be given to the third beneficiary – – but the trustees would have the discretion to decide whether payments are made to that other beneficiary now or sometime later. This means the introducer and the investor could still receive their 33% and 67% payouts of the proceeds of the platform, because trust expenditures are made legitimate by many other purposes and criteria than just the number of units held by beneficiaries. In fact, even if beneficiaries who are NOT trustees were to hold all 100 units, the trust minutes could specify that the trustees be compensated for their services for as long as desired, BEFORE distributions are ever made to the beneficiaries. This could go on for years.
Keep in mind that these percentages are just examples for illustration purposes. In other words, the NLT is nearly infinitely flexible. As long as certain basic rules are followed in the construction, design, and operation of the trust, the clients who have the trust written and customized for them have a virtually endless range of choices available as to how much to pay out to which parties and when. This makes it that much more of an ideal state-of-the-art asset protection vehicle for mature people who are harmonious, legal, ethical, peaceful, and noble in their intentions for the benefits to be enjoyed and distributed thereby.
To show how this is true, another totally different arrangement could work equally well. That would be for the introducer and the investor to become co-trustees of the trust and assign no Units of Beneficial Interest at all to themselves. Instead, they could assign all 100 of the units to entirely other outside individuals or organizations, but specify that distributions to such entities will be made at some other time further down the road. They could even make their heirs the beneficiaries, meaning no distributions will be made to them until the demise of the two trustees, or the age of majority of the heirs; whatever. That is an example on the other extreme end of the range of possibilities, and many other possibilities exist within those two extremes. This is simply to show that there are many, many legitimate options as to how an introducer and an investor can enter into a partnership in such a trust and satisfy the goals of both . . . while also benefiting any other people or causes they may wish, if and when they wish.
The trust can even be designed and operated as a foundation. There are many options.
The application of this single entity to the platform programs, while having no side agreements with any other outside entities, satisfies the “no side agreements” requirement of the platforms; while having the privilege of distributing the proceeds of the platform to the parties within the trust totally at the discretion of the parties who set up the trust, without any requirement of disclosure or justification to any outside party. It satisfies the needs and goals of the parties who set up the trust. Once again, this is a win-win-win arrangement, that fulfills all applicable protocols, and which has neither any violation of ethics or platform rules, nor any losers of any kind anywhere.
